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Essay
GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: WHAT’S A
CONSTITUTION FOR?
THE HONORABLE J. HARVIE WILKINSON III†
INTRODUCTION
A tragedy is befalling American constitutional law. Both left and
right in the gay rights struggle have indiscriminately indulged the
impulse to constitutionalize. Courts have used the Constitution to
augment their own authority. Congress has debated amendments that
would change the character of our founding charter. Even the states
have joined the headlong rush to constitutionalize.
Misuse of constitutions is not an academic point. By traducing
the American constitutional tradition, we are eroding not only our
sovereign rights to self-governance, but our ability as a society to
debate our deepest differences with even a modest measure of mutual
respect. Lawmakers possess many legitimate ways to protect
traditional marriage. But in filling founding charters with
amendments fellow Americans perceive as punitive, we both do
damage to the rule of law and embark on a course that will warrant
history’s censure. This Essay seeks to detail the full extent of the
damage that constitutionalizing the issue of same-sex marriage has
inflicted.
I. LAWRENCE AND GOODRIDGE: THE OPENING SALVOS
The first dramatic move to constitutionalize the subject of gay
1
rights was the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In it,
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† Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing certain private
2
consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex. The
Court’s tone was emphatic and, at points, quite eloquent. “When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
3
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”
Few decisions have been criticized on so many grounds.
4
Lawrence has been taken to task for overblown rhetoric, its
overruling of precedent,5 its repudiation of traditional moral values,6
its reliance on unenumerated rights,7 and its resort to foreign law,
8
most especially a decision of the European Court of Human Rights.
Still, the result in Lawrence is eminently just and humane; the real
flaw of the decision was to set the struggle over gay rights on a
constitutional course. The Court’s lack of faith and trust in democracy
was endemic. The majority simply assumed that the people of
America could not be trusted to curb sufficiently the intrusive powers
of the state. Only courts acting as guardians of the Constitution could
do this, though the evidence in Lawrence itself of the growing
generosity of popular instincts was overwhelming. Ironically, the
Court itself took notice of the “emerging awareness” in the political
process “that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.”9 And it admitted that “[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting the
relevant conduct [largely sodomy] are reduced now to 13, of which 4
enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct.”10 Prosecution
11
even in those states was a rarity. In short, democracy itself was on a
decent and humane path, and the Court’s decision to preempt it with
a problematic constitutional pronouncement was dangerously
shortsighted.

2. Id. at 578.
3. Id. at 567.
4. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 586–92.
6. See id. at 602–03.
7. Id. at 592.
8. Id. at 598. The majority cites Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 52 (1981), a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 573 (majority opinion).
9. Id. at 572.
10. Id. at 573.
11. Id.
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the
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that legislation denying
the benefits and obligations of civil marriage to same-sex couples
13
violated precepts of liberty and equality in that state’s constitution.
As with Lawrence, the decision is moving as a matter of oration.
“Because it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection
that express our common humanity,” noted the Court, “civil marriage
is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to
marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”14 To deny
persons of the same sex this choice, the Court concluded, “works a
deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community
for no rational reason.”15
Justice Greaney, in concurrence, issued a simple and poignant
plea. The plaintiffs, he noted, “are members of our community, our
neighbors, our coworkers, our friends. . . . Simple principles of
decency dictate that we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new
status, full acceptance, tolerance, and respect. We should do so
because it is the right thing to do.”16
As well it may be. But the Goodridge court was so supremely
sure of its own moral universe that it at best paid lip service to
powerful opposing arguments, and at worst ran roughshod over them.
Goodridge began by describing civil marriage as “a wholly secular
institution,” noting that “[n]o religious ceremony has ever been
17
required to validate a Massachusetts marriage.” After thus draining
the institution of spiritual significance, the majority proceeded to say
the history of one-man, one-woman unions likewise mattered little,
because “history must yield to a more fully developed understanding
of the invidious quality of the discrimination.”18 The court likewise
saw no state interest in promoting civil marriage as the optimal
setting for procreation, noting simply that “[f]ertility is not a
condition of marriage . . . . People who cannot stir from their
19
deathbed may marry.” Indeed so convinced was the majority of its

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Id. at 968.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 973 (Greaney, J., concurring).
Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 961 (citation omitted).
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view that it considered the opposing arguments to lack even a
20
“rational basis.” In other words, centuries of common law tradition,
legislative sanction, and human experience with marriage as a bond
between one man and one woman were deemed unworthy to the
point of irrationality.
Predictably, then, this ever-cresting judicial certitude manifested
itself in the impulse to constitutionalize. The court found that “[t]he
Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of
21
individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.”
Whether the basis of decision was the Federal Constitution (as in
Lawrence) or state constitution (as in Goodridge), the effect was to
subordinate the wishes of the people and their elected representatives
to the wisdom of judges.
The fact that Goodridge invoked a state constitutional ground
and thus immunized itself from Supreme Court review; embraced the
jurisprudence of unenumerated rights; created potential turmoil in
other states on such matters as divorce, custody, entitlements, and
inheritance; and did this and more on the basis of a highly contentious
four to three decision seemed to matter not much to the majority.
One can credit the Massachusetts justices both for the sincerity and
depth of their convictions and yet wonder how their own intensity of
belief failed to apprise them of equally intense opposing views.
Indeed, the depth and intensity of the arguments invited, not a
constitutional ruling, but a passionate engagement of the people on
the issue of same-sex marriage and a democratically derived solution.
II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
In view of this extraordinary judicial overreaching, it would be
entirely understandable for proponents of traditional marriage to
respond in kind. And the first impulse was to curb judicial
misadventures with constitutional handcuffs. Thus the Federal
Marriage Amendment, which reads:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of
any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal

20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 948.
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incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union
22
of a man and a woman.

The whole idea of an amendment gained momentum only after
Lawrence and Goodridge. The White House began researching the
23
possibility of an amendment after the Lawrence decision, and the
president did not endorse an amendment until after Goodridge, when
he said the Massachusetts decision was among the reasons for his
endorsement.24 The amendment has reached the floors of both houses
of Congress twice since the Goodridge decision. The House voted on
it for a second time in July of 2006, when 236 voted in favor, with 187
against and one voting present.25 The tally is short of the two-thirds
majority needed for passage, but a slight improvement over the 227
26
votes that the amendment received in September of 2004. The
Senate considered the amendment for a second time in June of 2006,
when forty-nine senators voted to advance the amendment by closing
debate27—considerably fewer than the sixty-seven votes required for
passage, but one more vote than the amendment attracted in July of
2004.28
The amendment’s backers described these initial defeats as just
opening skirmishes in a long war. “‘[H]istory has shown us that it can
take several tries before an amendment builds the two-thirds support
it needs in both houses of Congress,’” President Bush said after the
Senate’s 2006 vote.29 Senator Allard promised to press the
amendment again, saying, “‘If it’s up to me . . . we’ll have a vote on
30
this issue every year.’”
*
*
*
Supporters of the amendment have pitched it as a cure for
judicial overreaching. “An amendment to Constitution is necessary,”

22. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).
23. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Plans to Back Marriage Amendment, WASH.
POST, Feb. 11, 2004, at A1.
24. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2004, at A1.
25. 152 CONG. REC. H5320 (daily ed. July 18, 2006).
26. 150 CONG. REC. H7933 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004).
27. 152 CONG. REC. S5534 (daily ed. June 7, 2006).
28. 150 CONG. REC. S8090 (daily ed. July 14, 2004); accord Carl Hulse, Senate Rebuffs
Same-Sex Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at A20.
29. Hulse, supra note 28.
30. Id.
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President Bush said in June of 2006, “because activist courts have left
31
our Nation with no other choice.” The majority leader of the Senate
sounded the same theme in bringing the amendment to the Senate
floor: “The truth is, on the question of marriage, the Constitution will
be amended. The only question is whether it will be amended by
Congress as the representative of the people or by judicial fiat.”32 The
amendment, he said, would “settle the question of what marriage will
be in the United States. . . . an issue that rightly belongs in the hands
of the people . . . .”33
In fact, the amendment empowers judges. Its effect will be the
opposite of what its backers intend. The proposed amendment would
withdraw the debate over same-sex unions further from the
democratic process than the courts did in Goodridge and Lawrence.
Judges always have the last word when it comes to constitutions. They
would be the ultimate interpreters of ambiguities that are the
common and perhaps inevitable byproducts of drafting compromises.
And although legislatures can reverse judicial interpretations of
current laws with new laws, they cannot easily reverse interpretations
of constitutional texts. As a result, the proposed amendment presents
the ultimate irony: it would give final authority to the same judges
that the amendment’s proponents have accused of overreaching.
The present proposal illustrates these perils. It is the product of
what has been described as “an informal, somewhat ‘messy’ process”34
involving multiple constituencies with differing goals, so perhaps it is
no surprise that the text answers some questions, but leaves
unanswered many others. The definition of marriage as “only . . . the
union of a man and a woman”35 would seem to prevent courts from
mandating same-sex marriage as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court did in Goodridge. It would also forbid democratic majorities
from sanctioning same-sex marriage through legislation. But as
legislators considering the amendment and commentators evaluating
it have noted, the terms “marriage” and “incidents of marriage” are

31. President’s Radio Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1073, 1074 (June 3, 2006).
32. 152 CONG. REC. S5393 (daily ed. May 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist).
33. Id. at S5394.
34. Alan Cooperman, Little Consensus on Marriage Amendment: Even Authors Disagree
on the Meaning of Its Text, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2004, at A1.
35. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).

03__WILKINSON.DOC

2006]

12/19/2006 5:08 PM

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

551

36
ambiguous. As a result, the amendment would leave to courts the
question of whether civil unions are forbidden, required, or treated as
a matter of legislative choice.
The ambiguities begin with the amendment’s very first word.
Courts might allow or forbid same-sex civil unions based upon their
interpretation of “marriage” in the sentence, “Marriage in the United
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.”37 Under
a narrow reading, marriage represents a legal status that states may
define however they wish. The amendment simply forbids states from
conferring that status—however states define it—upon same-sex
couples. States could still give same-sex couples the benefits
traditionally associated with marriage through civil unions or
domestic partnerships. This narrow reading could be derided for
formalism, or praised for acknowledging the symbolic significance of
marriage as more than just the sum of its parts. It may find sanction in
public opinion, because many Americans oppose same-sex marriage
but support domestic partnership arrangements.
An alternative reading, however, would treat “marriage” as
encompassing the rights and privileges to which the term has
historically referred.38 The amendment would thus forbid states from
conferring those benefits upon same-sex couples. Two professors
involved in drafting the amendment39 have advanced that reading
using the following analogy: If the Constitution prohibited states from
keeping a navy, states could not maintain fleets of battleships just by
calling them an armada.40 Similarly, they argue, the amendment would
not allow governments to give same-sex couples the rights and

36. For discussion of the amendment’s ambiguities in Senate proceedings, see A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 45–46 (2004). Dale Carpenter has perceptively noted the
disagreement among the amendment’s drafters concerning whether the amendment’s first
sentence would ban civil unions, and has pointed out that the amendment would leave it to
courts to resolve this and other ambiguities in the text. Four Arguments Against a Marriage
Amendment that Even an Opponent of Gay Marriage Should Accept, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 71,
92–94 (2004).
37. S.J. Res. 1.
38. See Cooperman, supra note 34 (describing arguments of Robert P. George of Princeton
University and Gerard Bradley of Notre Dame Law School).
39. Id.
40. Ramesh Ponnuru, Times vs. Sullivan: In defense of the New York Times, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru200402091407.asp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2006).
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41
privileges of marriage simply by retitling them. It is easy enough to
see how either conception could convince a court. Either way, the
amendment leaves the final crucial say to judges.
Whereas the proposed amendment’s first sentence would force
judges to define marriage, its second sentence would force judges to
define its “incidents.” Through the provision that “[n]either this
Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
any union other than the union of a man and a woman,”42 some
backers hope to prevent judges, but not legislatures, from extending
legal protections to same-sex couples. Like the first sentence,
however, this second sentence raises as many questions as it answers,
and requires judges to decide them once and for all.
In particular, it is unclear what “incidents” the amendment
places outside state and federal constitutions. The incidents of
marriage typically include certain government benefits and special
43
property and inheritance rights, among others, but these rights are
defined almost exclusively by the states. The amendment might
change this, by making the “incidents” of marriage a constitutional
term of art. Courts would have to decide whether the amendment
governed the incidents of marriage however they are defined by state
law—meaning that the amendment would apply to differing benefits
from state to state—or whether the amendment required courts to
develop a uniform federal definition of the incidents of marriage.
Existing jurisprudence offers precedent for both interpretations. For
example, the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that no state
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”44 The Supreme Court has derived its definition of
45
“property” under this amendment from state law, but permitted
46
courts to give independent content to “liberty.” Both approaches to
the marriage amendment are possible, and judges would decide.

41. Id.
42. S.J. Res. 1.
43. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (listing government benefits and property
rights as “incidents of marriage”).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, of course, are
not created by the constitution.”).
46. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this court has not
attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Due Process Clause]. . . .
[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
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Nor would this be the end of the matter. If courts adopted a
universal definition of marriage’s incidents, what would they include?
For instance, would a right be an incident of marriage if it were
associated with marriage in every state, or in some proportion of
states? Furthermore, under any approach, courts would need to
decide whether incidents include only rights that are exclusive to
marriage—such as the special tax treatment given to married
couples—or whether they include rights made available on the basis
of marriage and a few other special relationships, such as those
relating to health insurance, hospital visitation, and rent control in
many states. The interpretative difficulties run on and on.
Those who would respond to these ambiguities by explaining
why their interpretation of the language is best are missing the point.
The question is not how the ambiguities should be interpreted, but
who will be responsible for the interpreting. Although the proposed
amendment seeks to remove the judiciary from the same-sex
marriage debate, the amendment will thrust the court further into the
debate by giving judges that power. It will validate federal judicial
oversight of marriage and all that pertains to it.
Whereas the amendment thus undermines its proponents’ first
objective of curbing activist judges, it is merely unnecessary to their
second goal of preventing one state’s recognition of same-sex
47
marriage from forcing other states to follow suit. President Bush has
defended the amendment in these terms, saying, “Decisive and
democratic action is needed, because attempts to redefine marriage in
a single state or city could have serious consequences throughout the
country.”48 The amendment’s backers say they fear these
consequences would come about through the constitutional provision
which states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other

individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
47. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER,
AND THE LAW 1086–97 (2d ed. 2004) (surveying issues in interstate recognition of same-sex
marriage).
48. George W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage:
Remarks by the President (Feb. 24, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html).
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State.” As President Bush said in endorsing the amendment, “Those
who want to change the meaning of marriage will claim that this
provision requires all states and cities to recognize same-sex
50
marriages performed anywhere in America.”
These concerns are misplaced, however, because states have long
been free to disregard marriages performed in other jurisdictions
when they deem the marriages contrary to their own public policies.
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies by its plain terms
to “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
51
State,” the Supreme Court has written that the clause “is not an
inexorable and unqualified command.”52 The Court has applied the
clause to require states to recognize each other’s judgments under
53
almost all circumstances. But thus far it has treated other areas as
giving rise to choice-of-law questions that states should be free to
answer as they choose, so long as they have significant contacts with
the parties or transactions at issue.54 As the Court has put it, “The Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject
matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”55 Because
marriages are not judgments,56 courts have long interpreted the
Constitution to allow states to deny recognition to marriages against
57
their own public policies.
All fifty states have adopted choice-of-law approaches that
utilize this power. They recognize any marriage that was valid where
it was celebrated, but only when doing so would be consistent with
58
the state’s strongly held policies. This exception has been used to

49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
50. Bush, supra note 48.
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
52. Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
53. See Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998) (“A final
judgment in one state . . . qualifies for recognition throughout the land.”).
54. Id. at 233.
55. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v.
Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
56. David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 7, 10 (1997).
57. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 112.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971); see also Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997) (“A public policy exception in some form is
recognized in every state of the United States and has always been part of conflict-of-laws
analysis in this country.”).
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deny recognition to marriages regarded as polygamous or incestuous,
and, tragically, to deny recognition to interracial marriages before the
Supreme Court held that antimiscegenation laws were
59
unconstitutional. It provides a means by which states can ensure that
any other sovereign’s recognition of same-sex marriage has no effect
within their borders. Indeed, the House of Representatives
recognized as much when it took up the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA),60 for one thing that its supporters and opponents agreed
upon was that states would be free to disregard same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions even without DOMA. The Act’s
supporters simply described this aspect of DOMA as a useful
insurance policy, whereas its opponents characterized it as
grandstanding that could weaken states’ rights by implying
congressional action was needed.61
DOMA adds an additional defense for states that wish to
disregard same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. It provides,
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
62
relationship.

The act is premised upon Congress’s power under the Constitution to
“prescribe . . . the effect” of each state’s “public Acts, Records, and

59. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 221, 609–61 (4th ed.
Michie Co. 1986) (1959).
60. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
61. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 9, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2913
(1996) (“[T]he Committee believes that a court conscientiously applying the relevant legal
principles would be amply justified in refusing to give effect to a same-sex ‘marriage’ license
from another state. But even as the Committee believes that States currently possess the ability
to avoid recognizing a same-sex ‘marriage’ license from another State, it recognizes that that
conclusion is far from certain.”), with id. at 37 (“[T]he prevailing view today is that states can by
adopting their own contrary policies deny recognition to marriages of a type of which they
disapprove, and it is incontestable that states have in fact done this on policy grounds in the
past . . . . Indeed, given that the power that states have to reject marriages of which they
disapprove on policy grounds derives directly from the Constitution and has never previously
been held to need any Congressional authorization, the fact that Congress in this proposed
statute presumes to gives the states permission to do what virtually all states think they already
now have the power to do undercuts states rights.”).
62. § 2(a), 110 Stat. at 2419.
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63

judicial Proceedings.” Because DOMA is one of the first invocations
of this power, there is no settled precedent on the extent of
Congress’s powers to pass such legislation. At a minimum, however,
the law offers states another plausible argument to bolster their
existing powers to deny recognition to marriages they deem contrary
to their public policies. No court in the time since DOMA’s passage
has deemed the act unconstitutional. As a result, in this arena, a
constitutional amendment is at most a backstop to DOMA’s backstop
for public policy powers that states possess without any congressional
action at all. Although the Supreme Court is always free to change its
existing jurisprudence, there are no signs that it is likely to do so in
the Full Faith and Credit Clause context, and so there is no greater
need for a constitutional backstop here than for a constitutional
amendment bolstering states’ authority to pass a sales tax, establish a
transportation department, or support public education.
Some have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Lawrence and Romer v. Evans64 do change this landscape by
suggesting that disapproval of homosexuality is not a rational basis
for state action. John Yoo and Anntim Vulchev have contended that
the Court called into question public policy defenses against same-sex
marriage by invalidating Texas’s law against consensual same-sex
sodomy and Colorado’s constitutional amendment prohibiting
governments from protecting gay citizens from discrimination.65 But
Lawrence dealt exclusively with the criminalization of consensual
adult conduct, and it is a long leap from striking down a criminal
statute governing private conduct to an unprecedented decision
telling a state what it can and cannot do with respect to civil marriage.
The Lawrence majority thus noted that “[t]he present case . . . does
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”66 Justice
O’Connor made the point more explicit still in an opinion concurring
in the judgment, writing, “Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex
relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist
to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral

63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
64. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
65. John Choon Yoo & Anntim Vulchev, A Conservative Critique of the Federal Marriage
Amendment, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 729–30 (2005).
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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67

disapproval of an excluded group.” Nor does the Court’s handling of
the novel Colorado restrictions that Romer deemed “unprecedented
in our jurisprudence”68 bear upon states’ interests in maintaining a
definition of marriage that is anything but unprecedented. It would be
astonishing for a court applying the rational basis scrutiny used in
Romer and arguably in Lawrence69 to hold that a state lacks a rational
basis to define marriage in its public policy, resting as that policy does
on centuries of tradition and experience. It would be particularly
astonishing for courts to make such a pronouncement in the domestic
relations sphere that lies at the heart of states’ competence. Given
that Lawrence and Romer are a far cry from this momentous step, a
federal constitutional amendment here would simply indulge the
worst suspicions about the Supreme Court, preempting a decision
that may never come.
*
*
*
Although the Federal Marriage Amendment’s conception of
marriage is firmly rooted in our national tradition, the idea of
constitutionalizing this conception is utterly foreign to that tradition.
The amendment would trample values this nation has prized since its
founding. In addition to shifting power from legislatures to courts, the
amendment would impose the values of the present upon the future.
The Framers conducted a revolution in favor of self-governance,
however, and they were well aware that using a constitution to deny
future generations the ability to rule themselves would threaten the
charter’s legitimacy. As Thomas Jefferson famously declared to
James Madison, “The earth belongs always to the living generation,”
which “may manage it . . . and what proceeds from it, as they please,
during their usufruct,” but not “make a perpetual constitution, or

67. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
69. Although Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, does not explicitly state the level of scrutiny it
applied to Texas’s statute, Justice Scalia concluded in a dissenting opinion that the majority
must be applying rational basis review, id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If Lawrence actually
applied heightened scrutiny to Texas’s statute under the precedents giving increased protection
to private sexual conduct, as others have argued, it would further reduce Lawrence’s relevance
to marriage, a legal status with ramifications far beyond the home.
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70
even a perpetual law.” To do so, Jefferson explained, would be “an
act of force, and not of right.”71
The Constitution demonstrates that the Framers took this
concern to heart. They drafted, first and foremost, a framework for
majoritarian rule in the present, which enables self-governance rather
than undermining it, as Madison suggested in response to Jefferson’s
72
letter. The document’s other provisions limit majority will, rather
than simply embodying its dictates. In this respect, the American
73
Constitution differs from the one proposed for the European Union,
whose more than four hundred articles spanning hundreds of pages
bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the Federal Register. In
contrast, America’s founding charter does not “partake of the
prolixity of a legal code”74 that would “deprive the legislature of the
capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to
75
accommodate its legislation to circumstances.” Rather, it granted
Congress broad enumerated powers, but eschewed majoritarian
prescriptions, because succeeding generations of majorities were
quite capable of prescribing for themselves. The Framers did not
handcuff the future to a mishmash of highly valued eighteenth
century government programs. It was not that they believed these
programs to be unimportant. But they did not equate importance
with constitutional embodiment. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson’s
University of Virginia—whose founding was one of the three
accomplishments for which he wished to be remembered—was
established through ordinary state law.
In contrast, the proposed marriage amendment seems premised
on the assumption that we must look to the Constitution to enshrine
every value we hold dear. Contrary to our traditions of succeeding
generations of self governance, it simply imposes the values of today
upon tomorrow. In doing so the amendment is doubly hubristic,
assuming that we know better than our children, whom we would

70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 2001), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s23.html.
71. Id.
72. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 70–71, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v1ch2s24.html.
73. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C310) 1.
74. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
75. Id. at 415.
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constrain, and our forefathers, whose example of restrained
constitutionalism we would now disavow.
It is particularly sad that the amendment would impose national
uniformity on the subject of domestic relations, an area that has long
been a preserve of state and local control. For in contrast to the
national government’s “few and defined” powers, “[t]he powers
reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and the
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
76
prosperity of the State.” Domestic relations are the coin of the local
realm. In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected a broad interpretation
of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce precisely
because it could logically give Congress the power to regulate
“marriage, divorce, and childrearing.”77 One benefit of reserving this
78
power to the states is to facilitate experimentation. Although Justice
Brandeis’s well-known warning against using the Constitution to stifle
the diversity of state perspectives was directed to his colleagues on
the Court, it is true for any branch that “[t]o stay experimentation in
things social and economic is a grave responsibility,” because in
stymieing development of multiple approaches and competition
among them, “[d]enial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the nation.”79
Given this tradition, it is no surprise that after Hawaii’s courts
80
briefly legalized same-sex marriage, many states deplored the
prospect of having Hawaii’s policy imposed upon them through the
forced recognition of Hawaii marriages. The Defense of Marriage Act
affirmed each state’s right to avoid having its domestic relations
policy determined by another sovereign. But the constitutional
amendment that many of DOMA’s backers now champion would

76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
77. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000); accord United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
78. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
79. Id. at 386.
80. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234, 1234 (Haw. 1997), aff’g Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
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undermine this tradition of state autonomy, depriving each state of
81
the ability to define the most basic principles of domestic relations.
Even as it would rework the balance between legislatures and
courts, between state and federal governments, and between one
generation and the next, the Federal Marriage Amendment would
send a powerful message of exclusion, because it would mark the first
time that the nation has used a constitutional amendment to limit the
rights of one group of citizens. Throughout our history, amendments
have been used to enlarge the American embrace. The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments all send a message of
82
welcome: The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, and the
Fourteenth Amendment extended citizenship to the newly freed
slaves and guaranteed due process and equal protection of the law to
all.83 The Fifteenth Amendment promised the new citizens that
neither their status as former slaves nor the color of their skin would
84
be used to deny them the right to vote. The franchise was extended
to women through the Nineteenth Amendment in 192085 and to
citizens eighteen years or older through the Twenty-Sixth
86
Amendment in 1971. These amendments represent the spirit of the
Statue of Liberty: that all persons warrant respect. But many will
interpret the proposed marriage amendment to stand for the opposite
proposition, and to be motivated at least in part by animus for a
particular subset of Americans. The message of exclusion would
sound all the starker after so many years of inclusive amendments.
And it would sound starker still for disregarding traditions of
federalism and limited constitutionalization that have been with us
since the Founding. In short, the Federal Marriage Amendment
might mean that gay citizens would never see America’s founding
charter as their own.

81. It is also noteworthy that the amendment would encroach on state power through
extremely intrusive means. Its second sentence provides that states may confer the incidents of
marriage upon same-sex couples through ordinary legislation, but not through their
constitutions. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005). As a result, the amendment not only dictates what
states may do in the domestic relations sphere, it also dictates how state governments may act
with what remains within their power.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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Many of the previous arguments may have a familiar ring
because backers of the marriage amendment have made them so
eloquently in earlier controversies. Consider the following statement
concerning hasty federal intrusions upon the sphere of domestic
relations:
The very least that can be said is that the complex and delicate field
of marital relationships and divorce, into which Congress has
sedulously declined to enter in the past, would now be gravely
affected by the tangential force of a constitutional amendment,
which would not even rest on a study of the manifold problems
87
involved.

That comes not from a liberal critic of the present amendment, but
from a canonical critique of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), a
criticism that was embraced by many of the conservatives who
champion the marriage amendment today. Or one could look to the
critique of the ERA offered by Robert Bork, who properly said its
transfer of power to the judiciary was “a means of displacing
democratic choice by moral principle”:
That was the reason for the Equal Rights Amendment, which
provided that it should be primarily the function of the judiciary to
define and enforce equality between the sexes. . . . [T]he amendment
represented less a revolution in sexual equality than a revolution in
88
our attitudes about constitutional methods of government.

Or one could recall the critique of Roe v. Wade89 as a “procedurally
deficient” intrusion upon state authority offered by Senator Orrin
Hatch, who supports the present amendment: “Procedurally, [Roe]
deprived elected state officials of any authority to govern abortions. It
overturned the abortion laws of all fifty states. It overturned the
rights of those legislators and the rights of the people who elected
them in all fifty states.”90

87.
88.

116 CONG. REC. 8019 (1946) (statement of Professor Paul Freund).
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 324 (1996).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. Orrin G. Hatch & James MacGregor Burns, Still Adequate for the Twentieth Century?
A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 871, 880–81. Others have also noted that “Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey could be read as an eloquent warning about the dangers of
injuring federalism by nationalizing any social policy . . . .” Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 65, at
734.
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To be sure, every proposed amendment is different. Some might
argue that the text of the Equal Rights Amendment was particularly
ambiguous, or that court-imposed uniformity concerning abortion is
particularly inappropriate. And some national crises make
amendments necessary no matter what their costs, as with the
Reconstruction amendments after the Civil War. But as conservatives
have long argued, the costs of constitutionalization are so
considerable that the nation should not undertake the process lightly.
There is no reason to backtrack on these principles now.
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS
It apparently was not enough that Goodridge prompted a
constitutional call to arms in Congress. The movement to
constitutionalize the same-sex marriage debate proceeds apace in the
states. The movement is as broad as it is swift: twenty states have
already placed an amendment banning same-sex marriage into their
constitutions,91 and similar proposals are afoot in a number of other
states. Four states have marriage amendments that predate
92
Lawrence. A surge of similar constitutional measures were adopted
on the heels of Lawrence and Goodridge: thirteen states passed
93
amendments in 2004 alone. Two states—Kansas and Texas—passed
a marriage amendment in 2005; and Alabama voters approved a
constitutional amendment on June 6, 2006. Constitutional
amendments appeared on the ballot in eight states in November
2006,94 and, if approved (for the second time) by the legislature
elected in November 2006, a constitutional amendment could appear
on the Indiana ballot in 2008.

91. The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Utah. See Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, No. 2005-35, 20051 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. 139–41 (LexisNexis); ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; ARK. CONST. amend.
LXXXIII, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, ¶ I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16;
KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14,
§ 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV.
CONST. art. 1, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
92. The states are Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada.
93. The states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
94. The states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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The precise wording of constitutional marriage amendments
varies considerably; indeed, there are nearly as many renditions of
marriage amendments as there are state constitutions. The vast
majority begin by defining marriage solely as the union of one man
and one woman. Alaska, for example, provides in Section 25 of
Article I of its constitution: “To be valid or recognized in this State, a
95
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.” In
contrast to every other marriage amendment, however, Hawaii does
not purport to define marriage or to limit what the legislature could
say about marriage. Rather, the Hawaii amendment constrains only
its courts, providing: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”96
In addition to defining marriage, marriage amendments typically
prohibit recognition of any same-sex marriage even if valid in another
jurisdiction.97 Some states extend this nonrecognition mandate to civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and other same-sex relationships.98
And many constitutional amendments make explicit the assumption
inherent in each constitutional amendment banning gay marriage:
that same-sex marriage is contrary to the state’s public policy.99
The biggest textual difference among constitutional marriage
amendments is the extent to which they apply to domestic
partnerships, civil unions, or other same-sex legal relationships. Some
amendments appear to ban same-sex couples only from the
institution of marriage; they do not facially preclude civil unions,
100
domestic partnerships, or other same-sex legal relationships. Other
amendments, however, employ a variety of textual prohibitions
designed to prevent both courts and legislators from creating any
legal status similar to marriage. For example, Nebraska’s constitution
states, “[t]he uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union,
95. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
96. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
97. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (“No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man
and one woman.”).
98. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (no recognition to any “union between persons of the
same sex”).
99. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16 (“All other marriages are declared to be contrary to
the public policy of this state and are void.”); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (“It is the policy of
Oregon . . . that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally
recognized as a marriage.”).
100. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (“Only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.”).
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domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not
101
be valid or recognized in Nebraska.” Other state amendments
prohibit not only the recognition of same-sex relationships, but also
receipt of the “incidents,” “benefits,” or “rights” of marriage by
same-sex couples. The Oklahoma and Kansas constitutions, for
instance, first define marriage as the union of one man and one
woman and then provide that “[n]either th[e] Constitution nor any
other provision of law shall be construed to require that marital status
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups.”102 Similarly, in Ohio the state may not “create or recognize a
legal status for [same-sex] relationships . . . that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
103
marriage.”
In stark contrast, other states—far from denying same-sex
couples the incidents or rights of marriage—offer marriage-like
benefits to same-sex couples pursuant to civil unions or domestic
partnerships. Vermont and Connecticut, for example, define marriage
as a union between a man and a woman, but afford same-sex couples
access to state-level marriage benefits through civil unions. In those
states, “[p]arties to a civil union . . . have all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to
104
spouses in a marriage.” Four additional states—California, Hawaii,
Maine, and New Jersey—as well as the District of Columbia provide
105
domestic partners with marriage-like benefits.
*
*
*
The placement of bans on same-sex marriage in state
constitutions is admittedly a more difficult question than the
enactment of a federal constitutional prohibition. Many of the
obvious drawbacks of a federal constitutional amendment are not
present in the context of state constitutions. Indeed, it can be argued
that state constitutional amendments embody the very multitude of
101. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. Constitutional amendments in North Dakota and Utah
similarly provide that “[n]o other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as
a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.” N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
102. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; accord KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16.
103. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002).
105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 32-701 to -705 (2001); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572C-1 to -6 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8A-4 (West 2006).
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approaches to same-sex marriage that the federal system envisions.
The amendments of Nebraska and Utah on the one hand, and the
more liberal approaches of Vermont and Connecticut on the other,
would appear to present precisely the sort of experimental diversity
that Justice Brandeis envisioned. State constitutional provisions are
also nothing if not democratic. The fact that the voters have approved
them may seem to insulate them from the charge that
constitutionalization takes government out of the electorate’s hand.
Perhaps for these reasons, most arguments against
106
constitutionalization have been directed at federal amendments.
But the focus on a federal marriage amendment ultimately misses the
point. Constitutionalization at all levels is an inappropriate way of
approaching many issues, same-sex marriage included. Amendments
to the founding charters of the sovereign states are for many reasons
a less desirable approach than legislation to the volatile questions
they purport to address.
To begin with, it is doubtful such amendments are necessary. An
observer of the same-sex marriage debate might believe—because of
the rash of state marriage amendments—that a constitutional crisis is
imminent. But this is hardly the case. Only one state currently
recognizes same-sex marriage and not once has a state been forced to
recognize a same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere. Indeed, every
appellate court to consider the issue post-Lawrence—with Goodridge
being the exception that proves the rule—has left it to state
legislatures to define the boundaries of marriage. In 2006, the high
courts in three states—Georgia, New York, and Washington—
rejected invitations to find a right to same-sex marriage in their
respective state constitutions.107 Federal judges are unlikely to take a

106. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, AntiFederalist, and Anti-Democratic, 570 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 3 (2006), available at
http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa570.pdf (“A [federal] constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage is unnecessary . . . .”); Carpenter, supra note 36, at 71 (“In this article, I argue against a
federal constitutional amendment preventing states from recognizing same-sex marriages.”);
Yoo & Vulchev, supra note 65, at 725 (“This essay . . . lays out the conservative case against the
[Federal Marriage Amendment] . . . .”).
107. Perdue v. O’Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, Nos. 86–89,
slip op. 5239 at 3, 10 (N.Y. July 6, 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968, 969, 990
(Wash. 2006). In Lewis v. Harris, No. A-68-05, slip op. at 33 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006), the New Jersey
Supreme Court required same-sex partners to be eligible for benefits equivalent to those
enjoyed by heterosexual couples but left the question of same-sex marriage to the legislature,
stating, “[W]e cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions,
history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right.” See also
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different course. In fact, the Eighth Circuit in July 2006 rejected an
equal protection challenge to Nebraska’s constitutional ban on any
form of legal recognition—including marriage, civil unions, and
108
domestic partnerships—for same-sex couples. The Eighth Circuit
held that sexual orientation is not a suspect class and that Nebraska’s
constitutional ban was therefore valid under rational basis review and
109
its “strong presumption of validity.” This is hardly the Goodridgerun-amok state of the world that marriage amendment proponents
suggest.
The tools the states possess to protect their preferred policies
short of a constitutional amendment are actually quite formidable. In
this regard, the states confront two separate sets of problems. First,
states must be able to hold their own activist judges in check. On this
score, states have many options. To begin with, state court judges are
subject to the democratic processes of the individual states to a much
greater extent than life-tenured federal judges. The vast majority of
state court judges—87 percent by one count—are subject to some
form of election.110 A judiciary that is so directly accountable will be
less likely to impose under the guise of a state constitution an
antimajoritarian view of marriage on its polity.
An activist judicial interpretation—should dire predictions
actually come to pass—would, moreover, be reversible. Stare decisis,
although an important promoter of predictability and consistency, is
not an inexorable command, especially in the realm of constitutional,

Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t is for the people of
Arizona, through their elected representatives or by using the initiative process, rather than this
court, to decide whether to permit same-sex marriages.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he Indiana Constitution does not require the governmental
recognition of same-sex marriage, although the legislature is certainly free to grant such
recognition or create a parallel institution under that document.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“[T]he [Equal Rights Amendment of Washington’s
constitution] does not require the state to authorize same-sex marriage.”). Contra Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 949, 969 (Mass. 2003). In addition, state courts have
failed to find such a right in the Federal Constitution. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590
(Ky. 1973) (“We find no [federal] constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage
between persons of the same sex.”); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (“We
hold . . . that [denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple] does not offend the First, Eighth,
Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”).
108. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 863, 871 (8th Cir. 2006), reh’g denied,
No. 05-2604, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22372 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2006).
109. Id. at 867 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
110. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 76.
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rather than statutory, interpretation. Adherence to a publicly
censured constitutional interpretation will thus hold little sway,
particularly over newly elected state court judges who campaigned on
a different interpretation of the constitutional text. In fact, when a
state court has suggested that same-sex marriage might be
constitutionally required, a prompt democratic response has
111
resulted. In some cases, that response has been constitutional in
nature, but there is a difference between an amendment adopted as a
matter of last resort and one passed preemptively. The Alaska
legislature passed a constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage less than three months after a superior court interpreted the
Alaska Constitution to require it, and Alaska voters approved the
measure in November of the same year.112 A constitutional response
to Goodridge is currently underway; thus even the result in
Massachusetts will ultimately be left to state citizens and their elected
representatives. In short, states are perfectly capable of dealing in one
fashion or another with their own activist judiciaries.
The second problem states face is that of not being subjected—
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or otherwise—to same-sex
marriages performed in other jurisdictions. Here, just as in the case of
holding their own courts accountable, the states are not defenseless in
the face of other state enactments and celebrations of same-sex
marriage. The previous discussion of the Federal Marriage
Amendment made clear the options that states possess on their own

111. See id. at 77 (“[T]he democratic processes in those states [Alaska, Hawaii, and
Vermont] immediately dealt with the issue by preventing the imposition of full-fledged gay
marriage.”).
112. On February 27, 1998, the Superior Court of Alaska decided Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). The marriage
amendment passed the Senate on April 16, 1998, S. Journal 3300, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
1998), and then the House on May 11, 1998, H. Journal 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998).
Similarly, after the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the state was constitutionally required to
extend the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867, 886
(Vt. 1999), the Vermont Legislature promptly obviated the need for a constitutional
amendment by creating a system of civil unions while defining marriage as between one man
and one woman, Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000-91 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 68 (LexisNexis)
(codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2001)). Likewise, less than two years after a lower
court appeared to require same-sex marriage, see Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), the Hawaii
Legislature passed and Hawaii voters ratified a constitutional amendment overturning that
decision, Bill for an Act Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Relating to Marriage, 1997
Haw. Sess. Laws 1246 (codified at HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (ratified Nov. 3, 1998)).
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113
without the aid of any amendment to the Constitution. Many of
these options make a state as well as a federal constitutional
amendment unnecessary, and I recap them only briefly here. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause reserves to each state the right to refuse to
recognize a marriage if contrary to that state’s public policy. States
have therefore long refused to recognize marriages that violate public
policy regarding polygamy and bigamy, incest, and underage or
mentally incompetent parties.114 Further, the Federal Defense of
Marriage Act not only defines marriage for purposes of federal law as
the union of one man and one woman, it also authorizes states to
deny recognition of same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.115 In
the unlikely event that a state’s own policy was less than clear or an
application of the public policy doctrine was otherwise in doubt,
DOMA articulates an exception to full faith and credit and thus
eliminates the need to resort to a public policy analysis at all.
Moreover, the rash of constitutional marriage amendments
overlies a comprehensive and nationwide effort by state legislatures
to address same-sex marriage. The vast majority of states—forty-five
to be exact—preserve the traditional definition of marriage (as
between a man and a woman) and/or prohibit same-sex marriage by
statute.116 These so-called “mini-DOMAs” normally authorize the

113. See supra notes 51–63 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (stating that incestuous and
polygamous marriages as well as marriages otherwise contrary to state statute need not be
recognized by sister states); Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. 1952) (applying
Kentucky law to the marriage of an incompetent rather than the law of the state where the
marriage took place); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. 1958) (granting annulment
to underage marriage though valid in sister state).
115. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see supra text accompanying note
62. Although supporters of constitutional marriage amendments have suggested that DOMA
may have constitutional infirmities, every federal court to examine the issue thus far has upheld
it under constitutional scrutiny.
116. At last count, twenty-six states expressly prohibit by statute same-sex marriage and an
additional nineteen define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. See The
Heritage Foundation, Assessment of Language Used in State Statutes, http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Family/Marriage50/Dataforall50States.cfm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (summarizing
statutory language regarding marriage); see also ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(b), (d) (LexisNexis
1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(b) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101(C) (2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, -109, -208(b)–(c) (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 308.5 (West 2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(1)(b) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38nn (West Supp.
2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West 2005); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-1, -3 (LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 32-201(1), -209 (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(5) (West 2005 & Supp.
2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2(1) (West
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117
state to refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. And a
number make explicit what is apparent from statutory bans on samesex marriage: that such marriages are contrary to the state’s public
118
policy. Only a few states—Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, and Rhode Island (as well as the District of Columbia)—
have no statute regarding same-sex marriage.119 With the exception of
Massachusetts, however, the common law in all these states appears
to leave with legislatures, not with courts, any decision to break from
historical definitions of marriage as between a man and a woman.120

2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040(2) (LexisNexis 1999);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89, 3520(B) (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(5)
(1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 551.1 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2)
(2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d) (2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-103 (LexisNexis 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020(1)
(LexisNexis 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1, :2 (LexisNexis 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 511.2 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)
(West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2005); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 2005); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, -38 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.204(b)–(c) (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1998 & Supp. 2005); id.
§ 30-1-4 (1998); id. § 30-1-4.1 (Supp. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-45.2 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010(1), .020(1)(c) (West 2005); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001(2) (West 2001); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2005).
117. See supra note 112. Twenty-eight states have statutory language denying recognition of
out-of-state same-sex marriages. Heritage Foundation, supra note 116.
118. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(a) (2004) (“It is declared to be the public policy of
this state to recognize the union only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the
same sex are prohibited in this state.”). Fifteen states have statutory language indicating that
same-sex marriage is contrary to public policy. Heritage Foundation, supra note 116.
119. Although Wisconsin does not specifically speak to the issue of same-sex marriage, it
does speak in the gendered terms of husband and wife, and the Wisconsin court has interpreted
the statute to prohibit same-sex marriage. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680 n.1 (Wis.
1994) (interpreting WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (1994) to mean that “Wisconsin does not recognize
same-sex marriages”).
120. The high courts in both New York and the District of Columbia have found no
constitutional right to same-sex marriage and thus left it to the legislatures to address same-sex
marriage. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 308, 309, 359 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam)
(rejecting claims under District statutes and the Federal Constitution that the District should
recognize same-sex marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, Nos. 86–89, slip op. 5239 at 3, 10 (N.Y. July
6, 2006); see also Lewis v. Harris, No. A-68-05, slip op. at 59 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006) (leaving it to
the legislature “to break from the historical traditions that have limited the definition of
marriage to heterosexual couples or to frame a civil union style structure, as Vermont and
Connecticut have done”). The New Mexico Attorney General has issued an advisory letter
interpreting New Mexico law as precluding same-sex marriage. Letter from Patricia A. Madrid,
N.M. Att’y Gen., to Timothy Z. Jennings, N.M. State Senator (Feb. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.ago.state.nm.us/divs/civil/opinions/a2004/SameSexMarriages.htm (“[N]o county
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State law then, as a clear expression of public policy, precludes the
forced recognition of same-sex marriage and renders state
constitutional amendments superfluous, at least to the extent they
purport to deny such recognition. In fact, a number of amendments
merely replicate existing statutory prohibitions. Nevada, for example,
incorporated the Federal Defense of Marriage Act into its state
121
Likewise, Alabama’s 2006 constitutional
constitution in 2002.
amendment borrows word-for-word from its current legislative ban
on same-sex marriage.122 This effort at making doubly-sure only goes
to show that state marriage amendments are a largely redundant
effort.
The marriage amendment phenomenon then can only be viewed
as a preemptive strike against what some hypothetical court in some
hypothetical jurisdiction might some day say. This is an insufficient
basis on which to amend foundational texts like state constitutions. A
constitutional amendment is not by nature a preemptive device. It is
instead an extraordinary mechanism—a tool of last resort properly
reserved for situations which present no other choice. To amend a
constitution preemptively, in anticipation of the proverbial rainy day,
is, simply put, gratuitous. Such needless use of the amendment
process is antithetical to the very essence of constitutional lawmaking
and to the notion of a fundamental, guiding, and multigenerational
charter. If state constitutional amendments were the only means of
addressing public displeasure over the prospect of same-sex marriage
then such amendments would certainly be a defensible undertaking.
But they are not in any sense the only option. There is a world of
difference between a constitutional amendment forced on a state and
a constitutional amendment passed preemptively. Although a state
with no other recourse is surely justified in responding to an activist
constitutional interpretation, gratuitous amendments to our most
basic documents of governance are hurtful and alienating in a way all
their own. There is no reason to crowd the fundamental charters of
this country with slights toward citizens whose friendship and

clerk should issue a marriage license to same-sex couples because those licenses would be
invalid under current law.”); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, -2, -6 (2003) (defining, in gender
specific terms, whom an individual may not marry).
121. See NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (“Only a marriage between a male and female person shall
be recognized and given effect in this state.”).
122. Compare Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, No. 2005-35, 2005-1 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv.
139–41 (LexisNexis), with ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 1998).
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contributions we welcome with the rest. Such is not the function of
our foundational legal texts.
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
It is necessary finally to fit proposed amendments to state
constitutions within some framework of American constitutionalism.
In contrast to the Federal Constitution, the constitutions of the fifty
states have given rise to over 5,800 amendments as of 1996.123 For this
reason, it is difficult to generalize about what state constitutions do,
let alone what they do not do. Some state constitutions, like the
Federal Constitution, speak mainly to the structure and function of
government. Others cover matters as varied and particular as state
lotteries124 and proper care of pregnant pigs.125 The amendment
process, too, varies. For some states, the amendment process must
begin in the legislature, whereas others allow amendment by popular
initiative. Some constitutions can be amended in a matter of months,
and others take years. In the face of such diversity of substance and
process, it is difficult to posit a unified theory of state
constitutionalism.
In some states, the incompatibility of a same-sex marriage
amendment with constitutional traditions seems clear enough. Some
state constitutions are, like the Federal Constitution, relatively spare.
New Hampshire, Missouri, and Virginia are examples of states with
constitutions that primarily address the structure and duties of state
government, the powers of local governments, and the rights of
citizens. For such constitutions, the inappropriateness of a same-sex
marriage amendment is self-evident. A constitution concerned with
the structure and function of government is no place for an
amendment defining the substantive law.
Other state constitutions include a dizzying array of detailed
provisions whose substance seems more traditionally legislative than
constitutional. The Alabama Constitution, for instance, has over 770
126
amendments, the majority of which pertain to one county or city. It
also includes provisions to promote “the production, distribution,

123. Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual
Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 27, 52 (1996).
124. E.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 6(A); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 5; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.
125. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21.
126. See generally ALA. CONST.
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127
improvement, marketing, use and sale of catfish” and to “suppress
128
the evil practice of dueling.” The Arkansas Constitution devotes an
entire article to railroads, canals, and turnpikes;129 the Idaho
130
Constitution devotes one to livestock. Such constitutions resemble
“super-codes” rather than constitutions. This approach to state
constitutionalism owes something to the rise of amendment by
popular initiative, which began with the progressive movement in the
early twentieth century and as of 2006 exists alongside legislative
amendment procedures in eighteen states.131 But many of the most
detailed state constitutions exist in states, like Alabama and
Kentucky, which do not amend by initiative. In the specific context of
same-sex marriage, amendments have arisen through both legislative
proposal and popular initiative. Of the thirteen amendments passed
in 2004, for example, seven began in state legislatures,132 and six were
products of popular initiatives.133
It seems undesirable to perpetuate the phenomenon of the
detailed constitution, especially at a time when citizens seem
increasingly ambivalent about doing so. Detailed constitutions
routinely give rise to complaints from one corner or another that they
are “too long.”134 In Florida, 82 percent of voters surveyed after the

127. Id. amend. 492.
128. Id. art. XIV, § 86.
129. ARK. CONST. art. XVII.
130. IDAHO CONST. art. XVI.
131. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3;
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; MASS. CONST.
amend. art. XLVIII; MICH. CONST. art. XII; MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273; MO. CONST. art. XII,
§ 2; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4; NEV. CONST. art. XIX; N.D.
CONST. art. III, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. XXIII.
132. The states are Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Utah. The legislative amendment procedures of every state but Delaware require amendments
proposed in the legislature to be approved by popular vote in order to be enacted. Thus the
distinction between legislative and popular amendments speaks to how an amendment is
initially proposed, not how it is ultimately approved.
133. The states are Arkansas, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon.
134. Press Release, Janet McCoy, Auburn Univ. Press, AU Experts: State Constitution
Outdated, Abused and Too Long (Jan. 22, 1999), http://www.auburn.edu/administration/univrel/
news/archive/1_99news/1_99constitution.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006); see also Tom Atkinson,
Polparazzo: Constitutional Chicanery, Proposals to Amend Alaska’s Constitution Abound,
ANCHORAGE PRESS, Mar. 19, 1998, at 5 (“Too many amendments.”); Gary Lindstrom,
Constitutional Amendments Meet the Weissmann Method, SUMMIT DAILY NEWS (Colo.), May 1,
2006, at A12 (“Constitutional amendments. You either love them or you hate them, but when it
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2004 election believed that Florida “sometimes” or “often” had
amendments on the ballot “that really should not be there,” and 72
percent believed that proposed amendments were the product of
135
In Alabama, an
“well-financed special interest groups.”
organization called Alabama Citizens for Constitutional Reform has
started a petition drive for a constitutional convention, in part
because the Alabama constitution, with over 770 amendments, “is
easily the longest in the nation and is [twelve] times longer than the
typical state constitution.”136
I would argue that citizens undertake such efforts because
overconstitutionalization is a bad idea. Constitutions should be
articulations of fundamental law, not second layers of positive law.
Some states have explicitly embraced the notion that not all changes
in law rise to the constitutional level. The Kentucky Supreme Court,
for instance, rejected a proposed constitutional amendment financing
a veterans’ bonus on the ground that the issue was an appropriate one
for a legislative enactment but not for a constitutional amendment.137
The court stated that the provision involved no “change in our
organic law” and that a “constitutional amendment [was] neither
necessary nor proper” to achieve its result.138 In support of its
position, the court cited an early Missouri Supreme Court case
holding that “‘[t]he purpose of constitutional provisions and
amendments to the Constitution is to prescribe the permanent
framework and a uniform system of government, and to assign to the
different departments thereof their respective powers and duties.’”139
The Montana Supreme Court rejected a state constitutional
amendment directing the legislature to apply to the United States
Congress for a federal constitutional convention.140 Characterizing the
amendment as “nothing but a legislative resolution” and a “transient
amendment for a specialized purpose,” the court held that the

comes down to it, amending the Constitution of the state of Colorado is a silly and lazy way to
govern.”).
135. SUSAN A. MACMANUS & SUSAN SCHULER, FLORIDA VOTER SURVEY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 13 (Jan. 2005), available at http://jamesmadison.org/
pdf/materials/318.pdf.
136. Alabama Citizens for Constitutional Reform, http://www.constitutionalreform.org/
whatswrong5.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
137. Stovall v. Gartrell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).
138. Id. at 262.
139. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689, 694 (Mo. 1910)).
140. State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984).
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provision “[was] not a part of the permanent fundamental law of a
state and should not be submitted under the guise of a constitutional
141
amendment.”
It is perhaps futile to bemoan the evolution of many state
constitutions into baroque collections of essentially statutory
material. But that does not mean that we should surrender our
commitment to constitutions as articulations of fundamental rather
than positive law. When states burden their constitutions with
essentially statutory provisions, they risk trivializing them.
Constitutions and statutes exist for very different reasons. The former
set forth the architecture of government and certain basic rights that
individual citizens enjoy against state infringement. The latter exist to
regulate all sorts of matters—abortion and capital punishment,
divorce and inheritance, schools, roads, property rights, and taxes—
about which citizens may hold the most passionate and intense beliefs
imaginable. That intensity, however, need not and should not
translate into constitutionality. Rather, it is legislative bodies that
broker compromises among opposing beliefs and zealous factions,
and it is legislatures that adapt to changing public preferences and
circumstances. It is impossible to predict what views electoral
majorities may entertain five, ten, twenty, or fifty years hence on
same-sex relations. It is the job of legislatures, not constitutions, to
reflect evolving standards and to register change from whatever
direction it may arrive. Statutes are more amenable to adjustment
and modification than constitutional provisions are. And American
constitutional tradition has always preserved for majorities the right
to overrule courts on policy matters through statutory amendment
rather than through the cumbersome process of constitutional
change.
This difference between constitutional and statutory law bears
quite directly on the question of gay rights. No constitution should
ever assign its citizens pariah status. No constitution should relegate
its citizens so symbolically and semipermanently to the shadows of
national life. As a matter of statute, however, the balance changes.
Statutes exist for the expression of values central to the imperative of
social cohesion. Statutes legitimately articulate within limits a
community’s aspirations for marriage, the raising of children, and the

141.

Id. at 828.
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142
conduct of family life. It is in this difference between constitutional
and statutory law that America strikes the balance between claims of
personal rights and assertions of community prerogative. Judges and
legislators who upset this balance tamper with our legal birthright.
Should marriage, however, be an exception to the rule of limited
constitutionalism? Marriage, of course, hardly belongs in the category
of catfish, dueling, railroads, turnpikes, livestock, or the many other
minutiae on which, as I have noted, the constitutions of some states
have seen fit to opine. Marriage is rather society’s most fundamental
institution, and it is entirely a fair question to ask why such a
fundamental matter as marriage should not make its way into
fundamental law.
The simple answer is that what is fundamental as a matter of
social policy has not often been thought to be fundamental as a
matter of constitutional law. Traditionally, matters of family law have
rarely found their way into state constitutions, even the most detailed
ones. The major changes in family law in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, such as the recognition of married women’s
property rights and the liberalization of divorce, occurred in most
states at the statutory level, despite the fact that these issues were at
143
least as appropriate constitutional material as same-sex marriage.
Even interracial marriage, which was infamously outlawed in forty144
one states at one time or another, was banned by constitutional

142. Of course, statutes banning interracial marriage are unconstitutional, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and outside of the context of marriage, the Supreme Court has
placed boundaries upon states’ regulation of extended family relations, e.g., Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating a Washington statute allowing “any person” to petition for child
visitation rights); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating city housing
ordinance’s constrictive definition of family).
143. A few exceptional states have constitutionalized such aspects of family law. See, e.g.,
ALA. CONST. amend. CCXC (authorizing the legislature to provide for termination of alimony
upon remarriage or cohabitation); ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (recognizing married women’s
property rights); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5 (same); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 3 (listing grounds for
divorce). Some states used constitutional amendments to abolish legislative divorce, a practice
in which state legislatures enacted special laws providing for the divorce of specific couples. E.g.,
MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.1; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 4. Because the abolition of this practice redefined the powers of the legislative branch, it is
unsurprising that it would be achieved constitutionally.
144. See Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social
Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49, 50 n.9 (1964) (“It appears that forty-one states have at one time or
another enacted miscegenation statutes.”).
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145
amendment in only six. Until now, the constitutionalization of
family law has been very much the exception rather than the norm.
Moreover, this is not just any family law measure, but one which
singles out a particular group of citizens to confirm their lack of a
constitutional right. State constitutions, like the Federal Constitution,
are no place for such measures. Although it is not unheard of for state
constitutional amendments to restrict individual rights, it is most
146
unusual. Very rare is a constitutional measure singling out a
particular group of citizens for restriction of its access to the
147
privileges of free society. The few examples of such measures
should give us pause: they include an Oklahoma amendment
establishing a “grandfather clause” exempting white voters from
literacy tests148 and an Arkansas amendment directing the state
legislature to resist desegregation by all lawful means in the aftermath
149
of Brown v. Board of Education.
Such restrictions are always wounding, but they are particularly
so when they occur at the constitutional level. Making distinctions
among citizens based upon facets of their identity is not what
150
Constitutions should affirm our
American constitutions do.
commonly accepted ideals of equality and our commonly held views
of personal rights. To include a negative amendment stating that
certain rights do not exist under the state constitution is not only
unnecessary from a legal standpoint, but it is also contrary to the
spirit of American constitutionalism, which is meant to affirm the
rights we do have, not to confirm those we do not.
In abandoning the process of legislative change, state
constitutional enactments restrict rather than enlarge democratic
freedoms. Just as many in Congress would do with the Federal
Marriage Amendment, state legislators and citizens are handing over

145. Id. at 51; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (noting constitutional
antimiscegenation provisions on the books in 1967 in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
146. See Galie & Bopst, supra note 123, at 35.
147. See Janice C. May, The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 163, 171–72
(Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988) (discussing instances in which the Supreme Court has struck
down state laws that discriminated against a segment of society).
148. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366 (1915) (invalidating OKLA. CONST. art.
III, § 4a (1910)); see also May, supra note 147, at 171–72.
149. See May, supra note 147, at 175.
150. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our
constitution . . . neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”).
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ultimate interpretive authority to the very judges they worry may
prove too activist. Even the most carefully drafted amendment will
not be immune from the unpredictable process of judicial
interpretation. State constitutional amendments are no exception;
indeed, they are replete with ambiguous language. State judges are
therefore vested with the authority, indeed the duty, to interpret such
ambiguity: “marriage,” “domestic union,” “similar to marriage,”
“substantially similar to marriage,” “legal rights, obligations,
privileges, and immunities of marriage,” “benefits of marriage,” and
“rights or incidents of marriage” are only a few of the phrases that
must be given constitutional meaning. These are not easy questions.
Yet ironically, many states are ceding by way of initiative and ballot
referenda—the most democratic forms of government—the ultimate
interpretation of these difficult questions to judges, the least
democratic branch of government.
The spate of constitutional amendments not only thrusts state
courts into the unseemly task of constitutionalizing domestic relations
law, it may also invite unintended consequences. Constitutional
marriage amendments have already been interpreted in ways that
interfere with the ability of unmarried couples—regardless of sexual
orientation—to make health care decisions and have rendered
domestic violence laws unconstitutional. Ohio’s constitutional
amendment, for example, is relatively simple. The two-sentence
amendment, at first blush, appears straightforward.151 Yet this
“straightforward” amendment has led two judges to declare portions
of Ohio’s Domestic Violence Act unconstitutional, and, as a result, to
dismiss felony charges of abuse against unmarried (but heterosexual)
males accused of battery.152
151. The Ohio Constitution states,
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
152. See State v. McCaslin, No. 05 CO 44, 2006 WL 459261, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21,
2006) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a domestic violence charge and invalidation of the
state domestic violence statute); State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212, at *8 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Mar., 23 2005); see also Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642, 2005 WL 4651081, at *1–
2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 28, 2005). In April, Ohio Representative William J. Healy introduced
a bill that would clarify the amendment, allowing protections for cohabitating unmarried
couples. H.R. 161, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). But this bill misunderstands the
fundamental nature of a constitutional amendment and thus highlights the difficulty with
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Many amendments, moreover, prohibit a state or its subdivisions
from recognizing any “legal status” for unmarried individuals. Such
language could reasonably be interpreted to prohibit public
employers from providing health care benefits to unwed heterosexual
couples as well as same-sex partners. Indeed, according to Michigan’s
Attorney General this is just what the Michigan amendment means.153
Common law marriages are yet another institution that may be called
into question by marriage amendments. In Texas, for example, a
couple may register an “Informal Marriage” by filing a declaration
with the county clerk. It is not too much of a stretch to view this
informal arrangement as a “legal status” granted to unmarried
individuals and thus prohibited under the Texas constitutional
marriage amendment. Again, it will be judges who decide.
The proposed Virginia amendment brings to a head all the
pitfalls of constitutionalization that I have discussed in the preceding
sections. For a constitutional amendment to take effect in Virginia,
the legislature must twice pass the measure and then submit it to
154
popular referendum. The Virginia amendment, which appeared on
the ballot in November of 2006, reads as follows:
That only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or
effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other
legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations,
155
qualities, or effects of marriage.

To say that this wording is opaque is an understatement. Although
the Federal Marriage Amendment poses interpretative problems with
constitutional marriage amendments: they cannot be changed by later legislation and any
attempt to redefine marriage legislatively is thus misguided.
153. See Constitutionality of City Providing Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits, Op.
Mich. Att’y Gen. No. 7171 (Mar. 16, 2005). The attorney general found that health care is a
benefit of marriage because routinely provided to an employee’s spouse. Thus, provision of
those benefits to an employee’s domestic partner would constitute impermissible “recognition”
of “a similar union for any purpose.” Id.
154. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
155. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A.
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the term “incidents of marriage,” the Virginia amendment creates a
multitude of such quandaries, including what are the “design,
qualities, significance, [and] effects of marriage” and what counts as a
legal status “intend[ed] to approximate” those features, as well as
what are the “rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, [and] effects of
marriage,” and what “union[s], partnership[s], or other legal
status[es]” should be outlawed for bestowing them. The amendment’s
scope is similarly unclear. Although it speaks ostensibly to the
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, it may reach into the
private sphere, because contracts between employers and employees
or between two individuals are not permitted to offend the strong
public policies of the state.156 The only certainty is that it will be left to
the courts to resolve these questions, and those resolutions will be
years in the making. Private companies will be left to guess in the
meantime whether their employee benefit plans are even lawful.
Moreover, the amendment essentially duplicates existing
Virginia statutory law, which provides that “[a] marriage between
persons of the same sex is prohibited”157 and that
[a] civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union,
partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons
of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall
158
be void and unenforceable.

It is unclear what the proposed constitutional amendment adds to the
protection of marriage afforded by this statute. If the amendment’s
benefit to the institution of marriage is to say the least uncertain, its
impact on the institutions of government is severe. It entails a massive
transfer of power to courts and effectively silences legislators who,
after a sincere gesture in support of traditional marriage, will be cut
156. See, e.g., Ulloa v. QSP, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 (Va. 2006) (“Indeed, we have remained
committed to the view that parties may contract as they choose so long as what they agree to is
not forbidden by law or against public policy.” (quoting Coady v. Strategic Res. Inc., 515 S.E.2d
273, 275 (Va. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted))); see also 5
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:1 (Richard A. Lord ed.,
4th ed. 1993) (“Illegal bargains have been classified both by the common law and in statutory
enactments as those opposed to positive law, those which are contrary to morality, and those
which offend public policy.”).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2004).
158. Id. § 20-45.3.
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off from making further clarifications or emendations by any means
other than another constitutional amendment. It portends a
diminution of representative government in favor of repeated and
protracted litigation, an odd step for a Commonwealth whose House
of Burgesses was the first representative assembly in the New World.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this Essay, I noted that a tragedy was
befalling American constitutional law. And indeed the chief casualty
of the same-sex marriage debate has been the American
constitutional tradition. Although electorates understandably are
more concerned with results than with process, the Framers were
concerned supremely with process, and that process has made
possible our civility, self-governance, and greatness as a democratic
nation.
I must emphasize finally the boundaries of this argument. I do
not contend that same-sex marriage is a good or desirable
phenomenon, only that constitutional bans on same-sex unions carry
terrible costs. Partisans see only one side of profound controversy,
when in fact there are two. It is not wrong for gay citizens to wish to
share fully in the life of this country, to partake of its most basic and
sacred institution, and to experience the intimacy, bonding, and
devotion to another that only an institution such as marriage can
bring. To embrace this view one need not believe that sexual
infidelities will disappear, but only that many gay couples will make
good on their vows and lead fuller, richer, and more productive lives
as a result.
That, however, is hardly the end of the matter. Marriage between
male and female is more than a matter of biological
complementarity—the union of the two has been thought through the
ages more mystical and profound than the separate identities of each
alone. Without strong family structures, there will be no stable and
healthy social order, and alternative marriage structures may weaken
the sanction of law and custom necessary for human families to
flourish and children to grow. These are no small risks, and present
trends are not often more sound than the cumulative wisdom of the
centuries.
Is it too much to ask that judges and legislatures acknowledge
the difficulty of this debate by leaving it to normal democratic
processes? The dangers of doing otherwise are clear. When we

03__WILKINSON.DOC

2006]

12/19/2006 5:08 PM

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

581

politicize our basic documents of governance, we deepen
exponentially the wounds of civic life.
The more passionate an issue, the less justification there often is
for constitutionalizing it. Constitutions tempt those who are much too
sure they are right. Certainty is, to be sure, a constant feature of our
politics—some certainties endure; others are fated to be supplanted
by the certainties of a succeeding age. Neither we nor the Framers can
be sure which is which, but the Framers were sure that we should
debate our differences in this day’s time and arena. Their message is
as clear today as it was at the Founding: Leave Constitutions alone!

